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Bob _____
Bruce _____DCI
16 July 1980PROPOSED SECDEF-DCI AGREEMENT ON THE GROUND RULES
FOR NET ASSESSMENTS AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSES

A comparative analysis is the display of data on or characteristics of two or more different sets of forces, groups, activities. The objective of the analysis is enhanced by a comparison either because that is the point that is desired or because it places even one set of data into a more meaningful context. Broadly speaking, such analyses can be characterized as static comparisons.

A net assessment is an analysis which attempts to portray the end result of the interaction of two or more sets of forces, groups or activities. Such analysis proceeds beyond the characteristics of the forces, groups or activities and into the method of their employment and external factors such as weather, morale, uncertainty, etc. Broadly speaking, such analyses can be characterized as dynamic comparisons.

Both DOD and the Intelligence Community perform both types of analysis, e.g., comparisons or assessments of the military capabilities of two foreign powers. When, however, one of the elements being compared is a U.S. military component, special considerations apply:

SecDef is the duly constituted national authority for describing how U.S. military forces will be employed. Others may have views on how U.S. forces will or should be employed, but SecDef is the only authoritative source of such information.

The DCI is the duly constituted authority for describing the characteristics and capabilities of foreign forces, groups and activities as derived from intelligence collection and analysis. Others, especially departments with integral intelligence units,

may have views that differ with the DCI's. They are entitled to utilize these in analytic work but should clearly indicate where their estimates are at variance with those of the DCI.

For the purpose of performing comparative analyses, the Intelligence Community will make available data on the characteristics and numbers of foreign entities to all agencies or departments involved. For such purpose the DOD will make available data on the characteristics and numbers of U.S. forces (but not operational plans, tactics, etc.) to all agencies or departments involved.

For the purpose of performing net assessments, the Intelligence Community will provide its estimates of foreign plans and capabilities to all agencies and departments involved. When such assessments involve U.S. military forces, SecDef's authoritative position will be utilized unless it is clearly stated how and why other employment data is utilized.

Normally, however, net assessments involving U.S. forces will be performed with the SecDef having exclusive control of U.S. force employment data; with the DCI having primary control of data on foreign force characteristics and numbers; and with either SecDef or DCI estimates of foreign force employment data.

Normally, comparative analyses involving U.S. military forces will utilize SecDef data on U.S. characteristics and numbers and DCI data on corresponding foreign data. Divergences from this general rule will be clearly stated.

The borderline between comparative analyses and net assessments is not precise. When approaching it, the ground rules outlined above for next assessments will be carefully observed.

DCI
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Observers in Washington believe that the anti-intelligence hysteria of the 1970s is cooling down. Congress now has before it a so-called charter which attempts to legitimize the intelligence system. This 171-page Bill would, if enacted, "authorize the intelligence system of the United States by the establishment of a statutory basis for the national intelligence activities of the United States," according to its preambular clause.

This highly complicated proposal satisfies neither the liberal-Left lobby nor the pro-intelligence forces. The former opposes it because it fears the charter would re-create the CIA despite the rigid controls; the latter opposes the Bill because, it argues, rigid controls preclude a functioning intelligence service, that it is difficult to set up rules for an agency which must work in secret.

The Carter Administration, which hitherto has been a sharp opponent of the CIA, has modified its stance, due undoubtedly to events in Iran, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, South and North Yemen. It may even have been affected by the "interesting coincidence," as James Reston put it, that while almost everybody else remained, Soviet and East German diplomats managed to slip away from the Dominican Republic embassy party in Bogota just before the Colombian guerrillas marched in.

The most important question is Congressional opinion. There is some evidence that the legislative leadership is showing a willingness to understand that, in the words of Sidney Hook, "unsavoury and foolish CIA operations are not an argument for the abolition of the agency but for its improvement." The fit of morality is, perhaps, over; the debate is not.

ARNOLD BEICHMAN

reports from America
on how Congress's fit
of morality destroyed
America's intelligence,
with repercussions in
Afghanistan, Iran and
the Dominican Republic